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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE	
Security Committee	
SECOM-M-257	
€ 28 July 1982	
Minutes Two Hundred and Fifty founth Meeting	
Two Hundred and Fifty-fourth Meeting Wednesday, 21 July 1982, 10:00-12:00 Hours	
Room 7D32, Langley Headquarters Building	
	25X1
Chairman Presiding	
MEMBERS PRESENT	
Mr. Lloyd E. Dean, Federal Bureau of Investigation	
Mr. Martin Dowd, Department of Energy	25 X 1
Mr. John McNamara, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force	
Colonel Donald A. Press, Department of the Army	25 X 1
Mr. Jerry Rubino, Department of Justice	
Mr. Richard Welch, Department of the Navy	
ALTERNATES PRESENT	
Mr. Frank Dill, Department of the Army	
Mr. Dan Downum, Federal Bureau of Investigation Mr. Louis Kachulis, Department of State	
Mr. Anthony G. Mitchell, Office of Secretary of Defense	057/4
Defense Intelligence Agency	25 X 1
ALSO PRESENT	
*Mr. John N. McMahon, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence	
Central Intelligence Agency	25 X 1
Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Community Staff	25X1
, National Security Agency	
Intelligence Community Staff	25 X 1
*Present for part of the meeting	
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general policy of the control of the	25X1
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Central Intelligence Agency		25 X 1
National Security Agency Central Intelligence Agency		25 X 1
Mr. Peter Nelson, Office of Secretary of Defense Mr. Roger Smith, Department of the Air Force		
Mr. Joseph L. Tierney, Federal Bureau of Investigation		
Mr. Robert Wingfield, Department of Energy Executive Secretary		25X1
	SECOM Staff	25 X 1

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Briefing on the Long-Range Planning Process for the Community	
The Chairman introduced Planning, Intelligence Community Staff, to give the briefing. said the 1985 Intelligence Capabilities Study - which estimates challenges in the 1980s, identifies program shortfalls to meet those challenges, and lists what is needed to remedy those shortfalls - would be updated and extended to the mid-1990s as the basis for the 1982 planning cycle. He spoke to a series of	25X1 25X1
vu-graphs describing the process and its schedule, inputs to and outputs from it, and initiatives the process would stimulate. said he expected the DDCI-chaired Executive Steering Group for the process to provide guidance which would cover security measures needed to protect new intelligence capabilities	25X1
as they come on line.	25X1
Preliminary Comments	
The Chairman:	
1. Advised members that copies were at their places of his reclama (SECOM-D-245 dated 14 July 1982) to tentative cuts in the FY 1984 SECOM budget requests. said the success of his reclama would depend substantially on the quality and timeliness of specific data supporting the SECOM requests and showing how their satisfaction would benefit the Community. He advised that we appeared to have enough information to back up the first two items in the reclama, but the fate of the others was likely to depend on the	25X1
quality and depth of material provided by Community departments and agencies. asked members to review the reclama paper and provide him by 26 July any further information they wanted considered.	25X1 25X1
2. Noted that the report responsive to NSDD-2 direction to review capabilities against hostile intelligence threats had been completed in July 1982. He said it addresses security in several dimensions:	
 Personnel security (report sees need to improve quality and timeliness of investigations; need for reinvestigative program, and for balanced polygraph capability). 	
 Physical security (should be continued and its lessons applied elsewhere; threat of foreign nationals working in US facilities overseas needs to be dealt with). 	25X1
 Information security (among other things, report sees need for authority to withhold from FOIA release technical data subject to export control; need to deal with leaks more effectively; need for better emergency destruction). 	

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 Industrial, operations, computer, communications and TEMPEST security are also addressed. 	
advised that the report is for our information only now. When White House response to it becomes known, SECOM will need to address security issues for which action has been tasked to the DCI and the Community.	25X1 25X1
3. Reported that action is pending by Judge Clark on the draft National Security Decision Directive on leaks, which was recommended by the interagency group chaired by Deputy Assistant Attorney General Willard.	25 X 1
4. Said the DCI had approved the report on Capitol Hill security against technical penetration. This notes that there is a problem and that the Community would like to help resolve it.	25 X 1
MOUTA TIME CO HELP (COUTE TO)	25X1
5. Noted that since most SECOM projects and programs are handled by sub-committees, members needed to ensure:	
 that those who represent them on SECOM subcommittees know the subjects dealt with and regularly attend meetings or send knowledgeable substitutes. 	
 that they are in regular contact with their subcommittee representatives to keep one another informed of SECOM 	
actions and to see that positions reflected by subcommittee members accurately reflect the views of their departments	
and agencies. said he had found from experience that communication between committee and sub-	25X1
committee members was not always what it should be.	25X1
6. Advised that this was was retiring after a long and distin-	25 X 1 25 X 1
guished career both with the US Army and DIA. Since his entrance on duty with DIA in 1972, has been broadly associated with SECOM and	25X1
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	And the second second			
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has <u>been a very ef</u> fective spoke	sman for DIA security.		recalled	25 X 1
that $oxed{}$ had served a on unauthorized disclosures, an	s the first chairman of	of the SECOM working contributions to	ig group SFCOM	25 X 1
in many dimensions. He said he	had enjoyed his relat	cionship with		25X1
over the years, and he wished h	im well for the future	•		25 X 1
7. Complimented Mr. Smith	in particular and Air	· Force Intelligend	ce in	
general for the excellence of t	heir "Sensitive Compar	rtmented Informatio	on News-	0.5344
letter." char understandable and interesting,	acterized it as a good and he commended it t	i job of making sci co members as an ex	kample	25 X 1
to follow.			·	25X1
ITEM 1 - Approval of Minutes				
In the absence of any requ	ests for change, the m	ninutes of the last	t three	
meetings, held on 19 and 26 May	, and on 24 June 1982,	, were approved as	written.	25 X 1
Comments by Deputy Director of	Central Intelligence			
Mr. McMahon presented	a Certificate	for Exceptional Ac	ccomplish-	25X1
ment accompanied by a cash awar	d for his services in	helping to develop	p the	
security procedures for the US serving as the Court's security	Foreign Intelligence S officer since its inc	Surveillance Lourt	and in	25X1
•				20, ()
Mr. McMahon then told memb greater as the Administration m	pers he saw the challer	ages for SECOM becouse of intelligence	oming e. He	
said he saw the Administration	as being sincerely in	terested in enhanc	ing intel-	
ligence capabilities, and as be	eing supportive of good	d security procedu	res.	25 X 1
ITEM 2 - Subcommittee Reports				
A. Security Awareness -		ed that Messrs.		25X1
were scheduled to show t	the security orientation	on for senior office	cials to	25X1
the DCI on 23 July. (The DCI vof the briefing.)	advised of problems in	arranging contrac	ts to	25 X 1
produce security awareness item	ns, and said he hoped	to use CIA channel	s to get	20/(1
the work done. He said the sul cover three areas:	ocommittee wanted vide	stape prietings pr	daucea to	
		a thugo paut couic	c	
In response to a question	ty - to be covered by a	said CIA an	d	25 X 1
NSA members of the Compute	er Security Subcommitt	ee were involved i	n ho	
developing material for the would task	his briefing series. (CIA Office of Securi	said tv) to interface w		25X1 25X1
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CIA's Office of Training and Education as needed to help accomplish this task.	
(2) Hostile intelligence threat - also to be covered by a three- part series. The FBI is coordinating development and production of this.	
(3) Coversion of the present slide-tape security orientation for	
senior officials to video tape format.	25X1
B. Personnel Security - reported that in their review of DCID 1/14 they had discussed at length OSD's proposal to reduce investigative	25X1
coverage He said the issue was held over to their August meeting, at which time a vote would be taken. advised that the sixth SCI adjudicators conference would be held 16-20 August. He said one more attendee was desired to fill out the class, and they they hoped to get another	25X1 25X1
SECOM member to participate in their senior security managers panel held the second day of the conference. noted that the Department of Justice might well be tasked to lead a review of EO 10450. invited members' attention to his draft memorandum to the DCI proposing that he write the Attorney General to request Community involvement in any effort to review	25X1 25X1
and revise EO 10450. Copies of draft were provided members	25 X 1
with a request for comment no later than 4 August.	25 X 1
C. Security Advisory Group -	25X1
	25X1
advised that would soon leave for Moscow to serve as State's on-scene security chief, and that the current chairman of the group, would be reassigned soon. then nominated Mr. Marvin Doig to serve as the	25X1 25X1 25X1
new chairman of the Security Advisory Group. Mr. Doig is being reassigned from	
to serve at the Department of State as chief of their Technical Security Division. No other nominations were offered. said he'd prepare	25X1 25X1
a memorandum on the new chairman.	25X1
	25 X 1
<u>ITEM 3</u> - New Business	
and had responded to questions on security issues. had asked the	25X1 25X1
DCI for his views on the possibility of more security services of common concern, citing as examples. Mr. Casey said he throught that was a	25X1
good way to approach shared concerns, and advised that he would like to review our suggestions. asked members for their written suggestions	25X1

D. said he saw a possible need to develop Community security of the Community. D. said he saw a possible need to develop Community security of the Community. D. said he saw a possible need to develop Community security of the Community when, pursuant to OMB Circular A-76, departments or agencies contract administrative services which involve access to SCI. Said oncerns had been expressed to him that the contracting out process might result contractor employees having broad, substantive access to SCI. Mr. Smith said we had in the contractor employees having broad, substantive access by contractors, at to allow incidental access by cleared personnel performing maintenance and envice tasks. Said he was concerned about the quantum jump in epth of SCI access that would be involved if contractor employees provided mmunications center support at the Washington level for a Community agency. Smith noted that DCID 1/7 does not address that sort of broad contractor cess. Said he understood that the National Communications counity Committee was drafting a policy on use of contractors in communications.	
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	was drafting a policy on use of contractors in communications.

E. Mr. Rubino advised that the Attorney General has approved expenditures to RF shield facilities in Main Justice. He said these would be available to the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for use. He noted that Justice's Office of Intelligence Policy Review recently moved into an SCI-accredited area.



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He acknowledged NSA help in <u>getting secure</u> phones to link the Internal Security Division with Main Justice.	25 X 1
ITEM 4 - Next Meeting	
scheduled the next meeting for Wednesday, 15 September 1982. He asked members to reserve Tuesday and Wednesday, 12-13 October 1982,	25 X 1
for attendance at the fall SECOM seminar	25 X 1
	25 X 1

